The euro under fire (iii)

If the Eurozone has been unlimited and Germany to return to the D-Mark, the European economies could recover – but the German economy had a high price to pay

For a long time, the request was to escape Germany from the eurozone and to "good old D-Mark" to return, a position with exotic status, which was primarily in the right-wing populist environment. Today, this requirement is among other things from Nobel Prize Travelers Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, as well as from the expanding terrible of the probation speculation, George Soros, to horen. What happened in the meantime? The right populists ultimately had right or the paradigms have shifted in recent years so? The latter is the case, the German export orientation has crossed the bow, deep tears through community and Europe does not seem to be willing to kit these cracks politically.

Exit scenarios

In the medium to long term, the eurozone will have to ask the question of whether financially solid and competitive economies such as Germany not only for the debts of the periphery castles, but ultimately also with taxpayers and depreciation in the balance sheets of the banks for losses. There is a weighty reason against one "keep it up". On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine that the German Welfare will accept it too long that the import of German goods in euro abroad is financed with its taxpayers. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to imagine that the population of the battered EuroLander such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal will have liked the starding of IMF and Eurozone too long.

Although a state bankruptcy ware for an alternative to permanent artificial ventilation by the Eurosystem – but a solution to the problems would not be possible, as states that go the way of the state bankruptcy need experience a very long time to return without external help and acceptable conditions supply the credit markets. Although a state bankruptcy was taken away the acute refinancing prere – without the possibility to devalue its own preservation, it became the framework conditions, which first had the precare situation, but nothing else. Even after a haircut, states such as Greece, Portugal or Spain were not competitive.

The crack within the Eurozone continues between North and Sud. On the one hand, there is a group of states with a positive current account and a relatively low budget deficit, which in addition to Germany also the Netherlands, Finland and Austria. On the other hand, there is a rough group around Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, which have both gigantic performance account deficits as well as rough budget deficits. These countries will also not come to a solid economic base in the long term without transfer payments – especially no, if the group does not want to reduce their current account surplus. Between these two groups, the tore extends and it is hardly conceivable in the long term that both groups remain in communal food.

Although the Lisbon-Authority permit the voluntary exit from the European Union, an exit only from the Territory Union. Nevertheless, most Volkerrechseller represent the position that one does not prevent a Euro state who voluntarily from the community must stopping. However, this requires the voluntary. If a land against whose will from the percussion union cancel, however, is not possible. For states such as Greece, Portugal or Spain, an exit from the Community detention is a tough cut, which was worn out due to the expected devaluation of national preservation and destroy purchasing power. Compared with a permanent starding from Brussel (EU) or Washington (IMF), however, such a cut is not necessarily the worst solution.

Translation of sud euro?

The sud euro – or "Medi" – the Suddeuropane states were given the opportunity to greatly revalue towards the dollar and the euro. As a result, imports from dollar and euro abroad became more expensive, during their own exports, as well as the leaning,. The sud periphery was thus competitive and was able to industrialize. The resistance against this "Sud-Euro" is therefore less of the countries concerned, but rather from the group of Landers, which are between the two extreme lies – Landers such as France, Italy or Belgium, which are only a low current account deficit and economic (still) relatively healthy.

With a departure of the deficient group, France, Italy and Belgium were suddenly the EuroLander, who had to trade with the Group’s current accounts for Germany. The result would be a harder euro, which was sustainably weak the competitiveness of these states. The consequences were foreseeable: France, Italy and Belgium were able to submit even more shares in the international market to Germany in the medium to long term and put their own economies on a hard test. Although the deficit wonder at the periphery of the Eurozone of politics and media are convicted again and again, they implicitly represent a balancing counterpoint within the euro area.

A separation in northern and sud euro goods only then a permanent solution, if the North Group was made out of states with economies comparable to the German economy – there are no other than the Netherlands, Finland and Austria Candidate. It is therefore more likely that the euro will not divide into two groups, but in national sectors, which although a flexible probation system is tied to an anchorage of anchor – it is bound to the euro or the D-marks, but still on demand. and can be deducted.#

The juxtapy of the D-Mark

A conceivable scenario was thus an ultra-colored D-Mark, which acts as an anchorage food for the likewise harvesting the Netherlands, Finland and Easter Rich, and a second meeting group, in which, for example, the French franc or a basket of the Member States’ observations take the function of an anchorage could. To avert acute financing ies of individual states, the crisis mechanisms could persist and also a euro bond is not dependent on all states having a communalized food. The disintegration of community food thus not provided the end of the European Union or even Europe, as it reclines uninfesting from Berlin and Brussel. On the contrary – every new beginning lives a magic. A say goodbye to the community has been subject to risks, but also opportunities.

With the end of Community entity, national preservation could be reassessed again in accordance with the economic conditions. The D-Mark was undoubtedly upgraded very powerful. An appreciation of 25 to 30% against the other European preservations would be a conceivable scenario. What were the consequences of such an appreciation? Imports were cheated for German customers, during exports – depending on the proportion of German value chip in the final product – for the end customers abroad were more expensive. This was forcibly leading to an increase in imports and a slight racy of exports. Or to bring it to a handy formula: Germany was finally the chamst of its economic strong. As this could look like, for example, our sadial neighbor Switzerland shows Switzerland. The Swiss franc is also a hard respect. Importgates are relatively favorable for Swiss end customers, yet Switzerland also exports competitive good to the world markets.

But such a "Helvation" Germany must be politically synonymous. And here are doubts attached. The German entrepreneurship – here, above all, the export industry – is known already in every thousand, in order to increase the wage labor costs, a danger for the location Germany. If you want to follow this reasoning, an exit from the euro then would probably be the death as the German model. The survival is a model that is in such extreme imbalances in the trade balance sheets, but not yet. Maybe the euro was exactly the art formation that has snapped the German model once again ten years of grace period.

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